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IMPLIED CONTRACUAL INDEMNITY: AN INFIRM
DOCTRINE WHOSE TIME HAS PASSED
The city of Downtown contractedDan's Sidewalk Service to maintain
the sidewalks along Mainstreet. The contractentered into between Downtown and Dan, provided the following:
Clause one: Dan's Sidewalk Service agrees to sweep the
sidewalks on both sides of Mainstreet in Downtown every
evening.
Clause two: Downtown agrees to pay Dan's Sidewalk Service $50 per day to sweep the sidewalks.
One evening, Dan, too tired to sweep both sides of Mainstreet, only
cleared the street's north side. The next morning,Patty, walking along the
south side of Mainstreet,tripped on some debris, causingher to break her
leg.
Patty sues both Downtown and Dan for negligence. Patty's theory
against Downtown is that as owner of the sidewalk, the city owed her a
duty to make the sidewalk safeforpedestrians. Patty'stheory againstDan
is that his contractualrelationship with Downtown created a duty on his
part to maintain a safe sidewalk
Downtown believes that Dan is responsiblefor Patty's injury andfiles
two cross-complaints. Each cross-complaintis designed to shift some of the
responsibility to Dan for Patty's injury. The first cross-complaint seeks
contribution. Downtown claims that if both the city and Dan are found
liable to Patty, Downtown is only responsiblefor paying its proportional
damages. The second cross-complaint is for implied contractualindemnity. Downtown argues that the court should imply a duty on the part of
Dan to indemnify Downtown for any damages Downtown is required to
pay. Before the cross-complaints are litigated,Dan settles with Patty.
Dan may now seek to dismiss Downtown's two cross-complaintsunder
California Civil Procedure Code section 87Z6(c).1 If a court determines
1. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877.6(c) (West 1980 & Supp. 1989). This provision reads:
"A determination by the court that the settlement was made in good faith shall bar any other
joint tortfeasor or co-obligor from any further claims against the settling tortfeasor or coobligor for equitable comparative contribution, or partial or comparative indemnity, based on
comparative negligence or comparative fault." Id. The same is true under New York law.
N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 15-108 (McKinney 1978). The New York law provides:
(a) Effect of release of or covenant not to sue tortfeasors. When a release or a
covenant not to sue or not to enforce a judgment is given to one of two or more
persons liable or claimed to be liable in tort for the same injury, or the same wrongful
death, it does not discharge any of the other tortfeasors from liability for the injury
1227
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that Dan's settlement with Patty is in '"goodfaith" it will dismiss Downtown's cross-complaintfor contribution.2 However, whether the statute ap-

plies to a claim for implied contractual indemnity is uncertain.' The
uncertainty regardingthe effect of this settlement-bar4 statute is one example of the problems caused by the troublesome doctrineof implied contractual indemnity.
I. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
The issues raised by this hypothetical reflect the current uncertainty
regarding implied contractual indemnity law. This uncertainty is a result
of a conflict between historical views of indemnity and the more modem
trend toward contribution5 and comparative indemnity.' The conflict is
played out most frequently among multiple defendants, each seeking to
shift responsibility to another.
or wrongful death unless its terms expressly so provide, but it reduces the claim of
the releasor against the other tortfeasors to the extent of any amount stipulated by
the release or the covenant, or in the amount of the consideration paid for it, or in the
amount of the released tortfeasor's equitable share of the damages under article fourteen of the civil practice law and rules, whichever is the greatest.
(b) Release of tortfeasor. A release given in good faith by the injured person to one
tortfeasor as provided in subdivision (a) relieves him from liability to any other person for contribution as provided in article fourteen of the civil practice law and rules.
(c) Waiver of contribution. A tortfeasor who has obtained his own release from
liability shall not be entitled to contribution from any other person.
Id.
2. CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 877.6(c). This Comment does not address the issue of what
constitutes a "good faith" settlement.
3. See Bear Creek Planning Comm. v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 164 Cal. App. 3d 1227, 211
Cal. Rptr. 172 (1985); County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 155 Cal. App. 3d 798, 202
Cal. Rptr. 444 (1984). Contra Stratton v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 190 Cal. App. 3d
286, 235 Cal. Rptr. 374 (1987); IRM Corp. v. Carlson, 179 Cal. App. 3d 94, 224 Cal. Rptr.
438 (1986). Note, while California law is unclear on this point, under New York law, the
implied contractual indemnity claim will survive the settlement. See McDermott v. City of
New York, 50 N.Y.2d 211, 406 N.E.2d 460, 428 N.Y.S.2d 643 (1980); Riviello v. Waldron, 47
N.Y.2d 297, 391 N.E.2d 1278, 418 N.Y.S.2d 300 (1979); Rock v. Reed-Prentice Div. of Package Mach. Co., 39 N.Y.2d 34, 346 N.E.2d 520, 382 N.Y.S.2d 720 (1976).
4. The term "settlement-bar statute" is not a term of art. In this Comment, it is used to
describe a statute that immunizes a settling defendant from indemnity claims brought by nonsettling defendants. In other words, under the applicable statute, the effect of a settlement by
one defendant is to bar other defendants from seeking indemnity from the settling defendant.
5. Contribution is a modem statutory scheme which allocates liability among defendants
most often on a pro-rata basis. W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 50, at 336-41
(5th ed. 1984). See infra notes 22-27 and accompanying text for a discussion of contribution
and comparative indemnity.
6. Comparative indemnity is a judicial modification of contribution which allocates liability among defendants according to their proportional liability for plaintiff's injury. American
Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 583, 578 P.2d 899, 902, 146 Cal. Rptr.
182, 185 (1978). See infra notes 22-27 and accompanying text for a discussion of contribution
and comparative indemnity.
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At common law, courts refused to apportion liability among defendants based on their degree of responsibility to the plaintiff.7 Indemnityi
was considered an "all or nothing proposition" completely shifting liability to one defendant.' The modem approach of comparative indemnity
allows courts to assign liability among defendants based on their proportional responsibility for an injury.9 Yet, despite the emergence of contribution and comparative indemnity, many indemnity theories continue to
complicate this area of the law, some working a total shift of responsibility, others apportioning it."0 Specifically, the continued use of
implied contractual indemnity not only allows courts to unfairly allocate
liability among defendants, but it also serves to thwart the efficient operation of statutes such as the settlement-bar statutes described in the
hypothetical.'1
This Comment makes two basic arguments. First, the doctrine of
implied contractual indemnity should be abandoned as a tool for allocating liability among defendants. Second, implied contractual indemnity
should not be used to avoid settlement-bar statutes. In support of these
arguments, this Comment focuses on California and New York law.' 2
There are two levels of analysis that underlie the arguments in this
Comment. First, implied contractual indemnity is a doctrine that has
developed without clear elements or parameters. As a result, the doctrine is ill-defined. In addition, the modem contribution schemes render
7. See W. KEETON, supra note 5, § 50, at 336-37 (5th ed. 1984); Note, Contribution and
Indemnity in California,57 CALIF. L. REv. 490, 493-94 (1969).
8. American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 591, 578 P.2d 899, 909,
146 Cal. Rptr. 182, 190 (1978).
9. For a general discussion of contribution, see W. KEETON, supra note 5, § 50, at 33641 (5th ed. 1984).
10. See infra notes 13-19 and accompanying text.
11. See CAL. CIrv. PROC. CODE § 877.6(c) (West 1980 & Supp. 1989); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG.
LAW § 15-108 (McKinney 1978).
12. New York and California are examined because they both have played a significant
role in the development of implied contractual indemnity, and they both have considered the
effect of implied contractual indemnity on settlement-bar statutes. For the development of
implied contractual indemnity in California, see Bear Creek Planning Comm. v. Title Ins. &
Trust Co., 164 Cal. App. 3d 1227, 211 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1985); County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 155 Cal. App. 3d 798, 202 Cal. Rptr. 444 (1984). Contra Stratton v. Peat,
Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 190 Cal. App. 3d 286, 235 Cal. Rptr. 374 (1987); IRM Corp. v.
Carlson, 179 Cal. App. 3d 94, 224 Cal. Rptr. 438 (1986). For the development of implied
contractual indemnity in New York, see McDermott v. City of New York, 50 N.Y.2d 211,406
N.E.2d 460, 428 N.Y.S.2d 643 (1980); Riviello v. Waldron, 47 N.Y.2d 297, 391 N.E.2d 1278,
418 N.Y.S.2d 300 (1979); Rock v. Reed-Prentice Div. of Package Mach. Co., 39 N.Y.2d 34,
346 N.E.2d 520, 382 N.Y.S.2d 720 (1976). New York and California have taken differing
positions regarding the effect of the doctrine of such settlement-bar statutes on implied contractual indemnity. See supra text accompanying note 3.
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implied contractual indemnity obsolete. Second, the application of implied contractual indemnity is inconsistent with contract law. The doctrine unfairly allocates risk without allowing for adequate consideration
of the parties' intent. Finally, the doctrine unreasonably expands the
scope of foreseeable damages for breaches of contract.
II.

BACKGROUND

In order to provide a frame of reference for addressing these arguments, this section briefly overviews a number of essential concepts.
These concepts include: traditional types of indemnity; contribution and
comparative indemnity; the policy concerns relevant in understanding
implied contractual indemnity; and settlement-bar statutes.
A.

TraditionalTypes of Indemnity

There are three types of traditional indemnity: express indemnity,
equitable indemnity and implied contractual indemnity. Express indemnity refers to a contractual relationship where one party expressly agrees
to indemnify another for any loss that the other suffers. 13 Thus, in the
hypothetical, if Dan had expressly agreed to indemnify Downtown for
any loss that Downtown might suffer due to Dan's failure to properly
sweep the sidewalks, the two would have entered into an express indem14
nity agreement.
Equitable indemnity is a doctrine that allows courts to shift liability
to a party who they believe is most responsible for an injury." Unlike
express indemnity, equitable indemnity does not require a contractual
relationship between the parties. 16 In Herrerov. Atkinson,1 7 a California
court described equitable indemnity as follows:
[T]he duty to indemnify may arise, and indemnity may be allowed in those fact situations where in equity and good conscience the burden of the judgment should be shifted from the
shoulders of the person seeking indemnity to the one from
whom indemnity is sought. The right depends upon the principle that everyone is responsible for the consequences of his own
wrong, and if others have been compelled to pay damages
which ought to have been paid by the wrongdoer, they may
recover from him. Thus the determination of whether or not
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

See W. KEETON, supra note 5, § 51 for a general discussion of indemnity.
This Comment does not focus on express indemnity provisions.
Herrero v. Atkinson, 227 Cal. App. 2d 69, 74, 38 Cal. Rptr. 490, 493 (1964).
Id.
227 Cal. App. 2d 69, 38 Cal. Rptr. 490 (1964).
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indemnity should be allowed must of necessity depend upon the
facts of each case."8
In the hypothetical, a court might decide that, based on the relationship
between Dan and Downtown, Dan should bear the responsibility for
Patty's injury. Thus, even though the land owner Downtown is arguably
liable for some portion of Patty's injury, by employing equitable indemnity the court would shift the entire burden of payment to Dan.19
Implied contractual indemnity is premised on the notion that a contract to perform a service contains an implied promise that the services
will be performed in a proper manner.20 From this promise, the courts
imply an obligation to indemnify the promisee for any foreseeable damages resulting from improper performance of the contract.2 1 In the hypothetical, the reasoning would apply as follows: Dan agreed to
maintain the sidewalks for Downtown. In agreeing to perform that service, Dan impliedly promised to complete the job in a workmanlike manner and to indemnify Downtown for any liability it incurs due to Dan's
improper performance. Thus, when Dan failed to maintain the sidewalk,
Downtown became entitled to indemnity from Dan for any liability to
Patty it may incur due to Dan's breach of the implied promise.
Of particular concern in this Comment are equitable indemnity and
implied contractual indemnity. Although they are distinct concepts, as
described above, the Analysis section of this Comment argues that they
are often confused by the courts. While implied contractual indemnity is
considered a contract doctrine, it is often applied so that it resembles the
tort doctrine of equitable indemnity. The effect is that courts are able to
allocate liability purely on equitable principles while at the same time
clothing their analysis in contract law. This Comment argues that this
effect significantly undermines the integrity of contract law.
B.

Comparative Indemnity

Contribution and comparative indemnity, much like the traditional
indemnity theories, both allocate liability among multiple defendants.
Contribution, a statutory doctrine, allocates liability among defendants
18. Id. at 74, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 493. Where a state has adopted comparative equitable
indemnity, the doctrine of total equitable indemnity is no longer necessary as a tool for allocating liability. Id. As the very purpose of a comparative equitable indemnity scheme is to allow
a court to allocate risk among defendants based on their respective culpability for an injury,
total equitable indemnity is no longer "equitable." Id.
19. Id.
20. Bear Creek Planning Comm. v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 164 Cal. App. 3d 1227, 1237,
211 Cal. Rptr. 172, 178 (1985).
21. See Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corp., 350 U.S. 124, 133 (1956).
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on a pro-rata basis.22 In other words, the total damages are divided by
the total number of defendants, each paying an equal share.23 Comparative indemnity,2 4 an equitable judge-made doctrine, apportions liability
based on proportional responsibility for an injury.2" Moreover, this judicially created indemnity in both California and New York, overrides the
state's statutory contribution scheme.26 Thus, when using comparative
indemnity, a judge will allocate liability to a defendant based on his or
her respective responsibility for the plaintiff's injury.2 7 This Comment
focuses on comparative indemnity which has rendered implied contractual indemnity an obsolete tool in allocating liability among defendants.
In the hypothetical, the damages would be apportioned between Down-

town and Dan based on their respective degrees of responsibility for
Patty's injury.
C. The Policies of Freedom of Contract and ProvidingRelief to
Injured Parties
Because the doctrine of implied contractual indemnity allows courts

to imply an indemnity terf into a contract, it necessarily has implications regarding freedom of contract. The parties may not have intended
that their agreement contain an indemnity provision. An important policy behind the law of contracts is that people should be able to freely

assign risks.2 " The implication of such a policy is that courts should be
22. See W. KEETON, supra note 5, § 50, at 340.
23. Id.
24. This Comment uses the term "comparative indemnity" or "comparative equitable indemnity" to refer to the modern formulation of the same name or as it is alternately and
incorrectly, referred to, "equitable comparative contribution."
25. American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 598, 578 P.2d 899, 911,
146 Cal. Rptr 182, 194-95 (1978).
26. Id. at 597-607, 578 P.2d at 912-18, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 195-201. California adopted
comparative indemnity with the decision in American Motorcycle; New York adopted comparative indemnity in Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d
382 (1972).
27. American Motorcycle, 20 Cal. 3d at 598, 578 P.2d at 911, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 194-95.
28. See Morta v. Korea Ins. Corp., 840 F.2d 1452 (9th Cir. 1988):
Despite recent cynicism, sanctity of contract remains an important civilizing concept
.... It embodies some very important ideas about the nature of human existence
and about personal rights and responsibilities: that people have the right, within the
scope of what is lawful, to fix their legal relationships by private agreement; that the
future is inherently unknowable and that individuals have different visions of what it
may bring; that people find it useful to resolve uncertainty by "mak[ing] their own
agreement and thus designat[ing] the extent of the peace being purchased.".., that
courts will respect the agreements people reach and resolve disputes thereunder according to objective principles that do not favor one class of litigant over another;
and that enforcement of these agreements will not be held hostage to delay, uncertainty, the cost of litigation or the generosity of juries.
Id. at 1460 (quoting Bernstein v. Kapneck, 290 Md. 452, 459, 430 A.2d 602, 606 (1981)).
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reluctant to assign a risk to a party that has not been clearly assumed in a
contract. In other words, when an event happens that a court believes
was foreseeable to the parties, and the parties do not address it in their
contract, the court should treat the risk as being assumed.2 9 In the context of implied contractual indemnity, the argument is that if the parties
did not provide for indemnity in the face of a third-party claim, then the
risk of such suit can be said to be assumed. Thus, the court should not
imply an indemnity agreement.
However, courts are motivated by policy concerns other than the
sanctity of contract.30 Courts prefer to provide maximum relief to an
injured party, and to allocate the liability for that injury to the most deserving defendant. 3 1 This Comment argues that in balancing these con32
flicting policies, the courts have undermined freedom of contract;
moreover, they have unreasonably expanded the scope of foreseeable
contract damages.3 3
.

Settlement-bar Statutes

As described in the hypothetical, settlement-bar statutes provide im29. See Lloyd v. Murphy, 25 Cal. 2d 48, 54, 153 P.2d 47, 50 (1944), in which Chief Justice
Traynor stated: "If it was forseeable [that] there should have been provision for it in the
contract. ... the absence of such a provision gives rise to the inference that the risk was
assumed."
30. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. International Harvester Co., 82 Cal. App. 3d 492, 496,
147 Cal. Rptr. 262, 264 (1978).
31. Id. There are three policies that are frequently considered in the analysis of indemnity
rules as they relate to settlements. "First,... maximization of recovery to the injured party
for the amount of his injury to the extent fault of others has contributed to it .... Second is
encouragement of settlement of the injured party's claim ....
Third is the equitable apportionment of liability among the tortfeasors." Id. While the Sears court argued that these
policies should be considered in the hierarchical order listed above, the California Supreme
Court disagrees. See Abbot Ford, Inc. v. Superior Court, 43 Cal. 3d 858, 872 n.15, 741 P.2d
124, 133 n.15, 239 Cal. Rptr. 626, 635 n.15 (1987), where the California Supreme Court rejected the idea that these policies should be considered in any particular order of priority. The
Abbot Ford court reasoned that each policy will vary in importance based on the context of a
particular case. Id. The court noted:
Although several Court of Appeal opinions have suggested that there is an established "hierarchy" or "priority" to the various public policy objectives in this area
that can be applied in all contexts ... our decisions have never embraced any such
mechanical hierarchical approach. Instead, we have generally attempted to harmonize the competing public policies, taking into account the specific context in which
the potential conflict between the various policies appears. Accordingly, the fact that
we have determined, in one setting, that a particular goal should properly give way to
another objective, does not mean that the goal that prevailed should always "trump"
the competing objective when a conflict arises between the two in a different setting.

Id.
32. See infra notes 181-203 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 181-203 and accompanying text.
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munity from co-defendant claims for contribution and comparative indemnity to a defendant who settles with a plaintiff.34 A central purpose

of these statutes is to encourage quick settlements, providing the plaintiff
with relief for his or her injuries. 35 The theory is that if a defendant
knows that he or she will have immunity from other defendants, then he
or she will be encouraged to settle.3 6

Implied contractual indemnity poses a problem for defendants who
seek the certainty of a settlement-bar statute. Since neither the California nor New York statutes expressly provide immunity from implied
contractual indemnity claims, 37 a settling defendant cannot be sure that
he or she will not be subject to future litigation. Settlement-bar statutes
should be amended to include implied contractual indemnity claims.3 8

This would lead to increased settlements because defendants would be
confident that settlement would free them from future litigation.
III.

ANALYSIS

There are two analytical justifications for abandoning implied con-

tractual indemnity. First, an analysis of the origins of implied contractual indemnity reveals that the doctrine is inconsistent with modem
comparative indemnity schemes. Second, an examination of the applications of implied contractual indemnity shows that the doctrine runs

counter to traditional notions of contract law by unreasonably tampering
with the parties' allocation of risk and by excessively expanding the scope
of foreseeable damages for breach of contract.
A.

HistoricalDevelopment of Implied ContractualIndemnity

This section explores the development of implied contractual indemnity at both the state and federal levels.39 The analysis particularly fo34. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877.6(c) (West 1980 & Supp. 1989); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG.
§ 15-108 (McKinney 1978).
35. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
36. American Motorcycle, 20 Cal. 3d at 603, 578 P.2d at 915, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 198. The
court notes:
As amici point out, section 877 creates significant incentives for both tortfeasors and
injured plaintiffs to settle lawsuits: the tortfeasor who enters into a good faith settlement is discharged from any liability for contribution to any other tortfeasor, and the
plaintiff's ultimate award against any other tortfeasor is diminished only by the actual amount of the settlement rather than by the settling tortfeasor's pro-rata share of
the judgment.
Id.
37. See supra note 1.
38. See infra notes 362-69 and accompanying text for this Comment's recommendations.
39. It is necessary to look at federal law when studying implied contractual indemnity.
Through its admiralty jurisdiction, the Supreme Court of the United States has played a signifLAW
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cuses on the effect that the introduction of comparative indemnity has
had on the doctrine in California and New York. In addition, this analy-

sis demonstrates that implied contractual indemnity did not grow out of
clear contract doctrine, but rather, was developed by the courts as a tool

to resolve inequitable situations." This analysis shows that the adoption
of comparative indemnity in California and New York has rendered implied contractual indemnity obsolete.
1. Early development of a duty to indemnify implied from contract

At common law, joint tortfeasors were unable to seek indemnity or
contribution from each other.4 1 This rule had its origin in Merryweather
v. Nixan,42 an English case which involved joint intentional conduct.4 3

Early American and English cases restricted Merryweather to its facts
and barred contribution for intentional conduct cases; however, twenti-

eth-century courts applied the bar against contribution to cases involving
joint tortfeasors liable for negligence.'

The rationale behind the law's

bar against contribution was that courts ought not "make relative value

judgments of degrees of culpability among wrongdoers. ' ' 41 Despite this
rationale, courts developed exceptions to the bar against contribution by
using indemnity law."
icant role in the development of implied contractual indemnity. See Ryan Stevedoring Co. v.
Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956).
40. See infra notes 41-86 and accompanying text.
41. See W. KEETON, supra note 5, § 50; Note, supra note 7, at 493-94.
42. 8 Term. Rep. 186, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799). This decision is noted in Note,
supra note 7 at 493.
43. See id. at 494-95.
44. See id. Note, supra note 7. It was not until 1957 that California modified the commonlaw bar to contribution among tortfeasors with the enactment of sections 875-880 of the California Civil Procedure Code. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE. §§ 875-880 (West 1980 and Supp.
1988).
45. Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 147, 282 N.E.2d 288, 291, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382,
385 (1972).
46. See Zapico v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 579 F.2d 714, 718-19 (2d Cir. 1978) (discussing the
development of indemnity law). The exceptions to the traditional bar to contribution fall into
two general categories: those based on tort law and those based on contract law. See also
Annotation, Contribution or Indemnity Between Joint Tort-feasors Where Injury to ThirdPerson Results from Violation of a Duty Which One Tort-feasor Owes to Other, 140 A.L.R. 1306
(1942). The following are the more generally accepted exceptions to the bar to contribution
among joint tortfeasors:
[W]here the parties acted in good faith in ignorance of the facts rendering their conduct tortious, and such ignorance was not superinduced by their own fault or negligence . ..or where the claimant neither had knowledge nor was chargeable with
knowledge that his act was wrongful.., or where the tort liability of which satisfaction had been made fot which contribution was sought was not the result of a culpable act or omission of the party seeking relief, but of a purely imputed wrong or one
committed by another which exposed him to liability of a constructive or a derivative
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One of these indemnity-based exceptions provides the theoretical
underpinnings for what is now implied contractual indemnity.4 7 A
number of courts have found that where two parties are jointly responsible for injuring a third person, and one of the two negligent parties owed
a duty to the other negligent party, that duty formed the basis of a claim
for indemnity.4 8 For example, in Seaboard Air Line Railway Co. v.
American District Electric Protective Co.,4 9 Seaboard Air Line Railway
(Seaboard) hired American District Electric Protective (American) to
operate a signal system." An employee of Seaboard was injured when
American negligently allowed a signal system wire to hang down knocking the employee off a freight car.5 1
The injured employee sued his employer, Seaboard, and recovered
$4112.50.52 Seaboard then sued American, alleging that American was
liable to it for these damages.53 Although the court noted the traditional
common-law rule barring contribution among joint tortfeasors, the court
nature.., or where the claimant was not in paridelicto with the defendant, although
he was delinquent as to the third party injured ... or where defendant did the act or
created the nuisance but the plaintiff did not join with him, but was thereby exposed
to liability ....
Id.
47. Id. at 1306-07. As one commentator stated:
To these exceptions to the application of the general rule, the courts in a few cases
have added another exception to the effect that where the injury which resulted to a
third person, as to whom both of the parties were negligent or guilty of a wrongful
act, arose from a violation by the defendant of a duty owing by him to the plaintiff, or
that where the defendant was a wrongdoer to the plaintiff but the plaintiff was not a
wrongdoer to the defendant, although both were liable to the person injured, the
plaintiff may recover contribution or indemnity, as the case may be, from the defendant notwithstanding the fact that his negligence also contributed to the third person's
injury.
Id. at 1306-07.
48. See Burris v. American Chicle Co., 120 F.2d 218 (2d Cir. 1941); Seaboard Air Line
Ry. Co. v. American Dist. Elec. Protective Co., 106 Fla. 330, 143 So. 316 (1932); McFall v.
Compagnie Maritime Belge (Lloyd Royal) S.A., 304 N.Y. 314, 107 N.E. 463 (1952); Phoenix
Bridge Co. v. Creem, 102 A.D. 354, 92 N.Y.S. 855 (1905). While a number of courts in a
variety of jurisdictions began to use an implied contractual duty to indemnify and in effect
allow contribution, "[tihe cases expressly basing the decision allowing contribution or indemnity upon the ground of a breach by the defendant of a duty owing by him the plaintiff are
rare." Annotation, supra note 46, at 1307. In addition, even cases that base their decision to
allow indemnity exclusively upon the breach of a contractual duty tend to treat indemnity
more like a tort issue rather than a contract issue. See Burris,Seaboard,McFall, and Phoenix.
Thus, implied contractual indemnity was initially used to circumvent the common-law bar to
contribution. Annotation, supra note 46 at 1306-07.
49. 106 Fla. 330, 143 So. 316 (1932).
50. Id. at 331, 143 So. at 316.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
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also ruled that an exception existed to the common-law rule. 4 The court
determined that where a duty is owed by one tortfeasor to another, and
the violation of that duty is the primary cause of the injury, the underlying duty may form the basis of a claim for indemnity."5
Analyzing this exception, the court recognized that the contract obligated American to "maintain" and "operate" the signal system.5 6 This
duty formed the basis for allowing Seaboard to prevail in its indemnity
action against American.57
The Seaboard court did not clearly articulate the doctrine of implied
contractual indemnity. The court used the contract to establish the duty,
yet it spoke of the indemnity claim itself as a tort action:
But the negligence of the signal company, in breaching its duty
not to let the wire sag to the injury of the railroad company's
servants for which the railroad company might become liable,
gave rise to the tort action by the railroad company, not for the
breach of duty which the signal company owed the injured railroad employee, but for a breach of the duty which the signal
company owed the railroad company under the contractual relationship which had been brought into existence between
58
them.
Thus, the Seaboard court did not view the implied duty to indemnify as
requiring any sort of contract analysis. The court did not examine any
prior negotiations of the parties nor did it carefully examine the language
of the agreement itself to determine whether the parties agreed to allocate the duty of indemnity to American. Instead, the court used the contract to establish what can only be described as a quasi-tort duty of
contribution. Essentially, the Seaboard court used the contract-based
duty to avoid the common-law bar to contribution.
New York also early recognized a right of indemnity based on a
contractual relationship. In Phoenix Bridge Co. v. Creem, 9 a railroad
company hired Phoenix Bridge Company (Phoenix) to build an extension
to an elevated railroad.' Phoenix subcontracted to Creem, who negligently left a heap of stones on a sidewalk which caused a pedestrian to
trip.6 1 The pedestrian sued Phoenix and recovered; Phoenix then sued
54. Id.

55. Id.
56. Id. at 330, 143 So. at 316.
57. Id. at 330, 143 So. at 317.
58. Id. at 331, 143 So. at 317 (emphasis added).
59. 102 A.D. 354, 92 N.Y.S. 855 (1905).

60. Id.
61. Id. at 355, 92 N.Y.S. at 855-56.
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Creem seeking indemnity.6 2 The court allowed the indemnity claim, rea-

soning that Phoenix was entitled to rely 6upon
Creem to properly dis3
charge the duty created by their contract.
There are a number of interesting elements to the Phoenix decision.

First, as in Seaboard, the Phoenix court did not examine the contract in
detail, except to note that the agreement contained no express indemnity

provision.'

The court perfunctorily noted that, "as between themselves,

the Phoenix was entitled to rely upon the Creem to discharge the duty

because of their contractual relations."6 " Second, as in Seaboard, the
court's analysis of the issues was more akin to a tort analysis than a
contract analysis.6 6 The Phoenix court cited earlier New York cases for

the proposition that "the law implies for the circumstances an agreement
to indemnify."'6 7 However, the language cited by the court does not re-

veal the contract theory upon which its holding is based, but rather provides a tort/equity rationale for its decision. The court stated that, "the
right to indemnity rests upon the principle that everyone is responsible

for the consequences of his own wrong, and, if another person has been
compelled to pay the damages which the wrongdoer should have paid,

the latter becomes liable to the former."6 "

Both Phoenix and Seaboard reflect the thinking of the early courts

that articulated a theory of implied contractual indemnity.69 The courts
did not ground their reasoning in contract law; rather, they took a quasitort approach.70 The use of the contract merely appears to be a device to
62. Id., 92 N.Y.S. at 856.
63. Id., 92 N.Y.S. at 856-57.
64. Id., 92 N.Y.S. at 856.
65. Id.
66. Id., 92 N.Y.S. at 856-57.
67. Id. at 356, 92 N.Y.S. at 857 (citing Dunn v. Uvalde Asphalt Paving Co., 175 N.Y. 214,
217, 67 N.E. 439, 439 (1903)); see also Oceanic Steam Nay. Co. v. Compania Transatlantic
Espanola, 134 N.Y. 461, 31 N.E. 987 (1892); Village of Port Jervis v. First Nat'l Bank, 96
N.Y. 550 (1884).
68. Id. (citing Dunn v. Uvalde Asphalt Paving Co., 175 N.Y. 214, 217, 67 N.E. 439, 439
(1903)). The court in Phoenix also discussed the relationship between the exception based on
duty, and the exception based on a claim by a party that his or her liability is purely derivative
and that he or she is not guilty of any culpable act. Id., 92 N.Y.S. at 856. The court noted that
although Phoenix did not actively create the condition that injured the pedestrian, Phoenix
had an affirmative duty to see that the street remained reasonably safe because the work necessarily created a dangerous condition on the street. Id. Despite this reasoning, the court ruled
that because of the contractual duty owed by Creem, Phoenix "could only be deprived of the
right of indemnity by proof that it did in fact participate in some manner in the omission,
beyond its mere failure to perform the duty imposed on both by the law." Id., 92 N.Y.S. at
856-57 (emphasis added).
69. See generally Annotation, supra note 36, at 1306-12.
70. Phoenix, 102 A.D. at 354, 92 N.Y.S. at 855; Seaboard, 106 Fla. at 330, 143 So. at 316.
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avoid the harshness of the bar to contribution. Although these cases may
have been equitably decided, they lead to the creation of a doctrineimplied contractual indemnity-that is superfluous if contribution is
available among multiple tortfeasors. Specifically, later courts have ignored that these decisions reflected an attempt by courts to avoid what
was perceived to be the harsh effect of the bar to contribution. 7 1 This
erroneous line of interpretation is exemplified by the development of implied contractual indemnity in California. Before examining the California cases in detail, an examination of a very significant United States
Supreme Court decision is necessary.
Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-AtlanticSteamship Corp.7 2 was the first
major case in which the Supreme Court held that a promise to perform a
task includes the duty to carry out the task properly. 73 The Court held
that where a breach of the promisor's duty subjects the promisee to liability toward third persons, the promisee is entitled to indemnification.7 4 In
Ryan, an employee of Ryan Stevedoring Company (Company) was injured while unloading rolls of pulpboard from a ship owned by Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corporation (Pan-Atlantic).75 One of the rolls broke
loose and injured the employee. 76 The employee sued Pan-Atlantic alleging that it had failed to provide him with a safe place to work, and the
employee recovered $75,000 from Pan-Atlantic.7 7
Subsequently, Pan-Atlantic sought indemnity from the Company on
the theory that the employee's injuries were "solely attributable to the
negligent manner in which [the Company] ... had stowed the rolls of
pulp."17 8 The Company and Pan-Atlantic had not entered into an express
indemnity agreement. 79 At the time of trial, federal law did not recognize contribution among tortfeasors as a theory of shifting liability. 0
The Supreme Court, however, reversed the district court.8 ' In requiring
the Company to indemnify Pan-Atlantic, the Court reasoned:
71. See, eg., Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corp., 350 U.S. 124, 133
(1956); Bear Creek Planning Comm. v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 164 Cal. App. 3d 1227,211 Cal.
Rptr. 172 (1985).
72. 350 U.S. 124 (1956).
73. Id. at 133. Ryan cites no United States Supreme Court cases in support of its implication of a duty to indemnify.
74. Id. at 133.
75. Id. at 126.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 127.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 132.
80. Id. at 128.
81. Id. at 135.
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The shipowner here holds [the Company's] uncontroverted
agreement to perform all of the shipowner's stevedoring operations at the time and place where the cargo in question was
loaded. That agreement necessarily includes [the Company's]
obligation not only to stow the pulp rolls, but to stow them
properly and safely. Competency and safety of stowage are inescapable elements of the service undertaken. This obligation is
not a quasi-contractual obligation implied in law or arising out
of a noncontractual relationship. It is of the essence of [the
Company's] stevedoring contract.8 2
Thus, Ryan firmly established in federal law the doctrine of implied
contractual indemnity. 3 Ryan was followed two years later by the
Court's decision in Weyerhaeuser Steamship Co. v. Nacirema Co.,84
which also involved a contract for stevedoring services.8 5 Once again,
the Court ruled that a contract to perform a service contained an implied
obligation to indemnify. 6 Thus, in the span of only two years, the Court
clearly established the doctrine of implied contractual indemnity.
2.

Implied contractual indemnity in California
a. development

Implied contractual indemnity has evolved in California as if it were
grounded in contract law not tort law.8 7 As a result, courts have frequently relied on the doctrine to avoid what they perceive as inequitable
situations and to avoid the immunity created by settlement-bar statutes,
which apply to torts. 88
The seminal implied contractual indemnity case in California is San
Francisco Unified School District v. California Building Co.89 In San
Francisco Unified, California Building Maintenance Company (Com82. Id at 133.
83. Ryan also played a significant role in the development of the doctrine in California.
The court in San Francisco Unified School Dist. v. California Building Co., 162 Cal. App. 2d
434, 328 P.2d 785 (1958), the case establishing the doctrine in California, relied heavily on
Ryan. Id. at 446-48, 328 P.2d at 793-94.
84. 355 U.S. 563 (1958).
85. Id. at 564.
86. Id. at 565.
87. Bear Creek, 164 Cal. App. 3d at 1237, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 178.
88. Id.
89. 162 Cal. App. 2d 434, 328 P.2d 785 (1958). In San Francisco Unified, the court cited
no California cases to support its reasoning on implied contractual indemnity. Instead, the
court reviewed authorities from other jurisdictions and noted that "[t]here are quite a number
of cases permitting the third party to recover under such circumstances from the one who
breached the contract, even in the absence of an express contract of indemnification. The
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pany) had a contract with the city of San Francisco to wash the windows
of certain public buildings.9" Richard Dubay, an employee of the Company, was injured when he fell while washing the windows at Galileo
High School.9 1 Dubay successfully brought suit against the San Francisco School District alleging that the School District had failed to provide him a safe place to work.92 After paying Dubay's judgment, the

School District brought a breach of contract action against the Company
on the theory that "the [company] permitted Dubay to wash the window

in question without adequate safety equipment and in a manner9 3in direct
violation of the terms of its contract with the school district."
The court carefully reviewed the text of the contract and concluded

that the Company had breached its contract with the School District by
permitting its employees to work in a dangerous manner.94 After reviewing cases from other jurisdictions,9" the court held that the Company's
breach of the contract created an implied duty to indemnify the School
District.96 That California still barred contribution among tortfeasors
97
when San Francisco Unified was decided, is important to note.
precise theory upon which recovery is permitted in such cases is not too clear." Id. at 440, 328
P.2d at 789. See cases cited infra note 95.
90. Id. at 435, 328 P.2d at 786.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 436, 328 P.2d at 786.
94. Id. at 436-37, 328 P.2d at 787. The court's analysis of the contract was as follows:
The contract contains several provisions here relevant. It required the maintenance
company to "furnish all labor, materials, and equipment necessary to perform in a
first-class manner the work outlined." It also provided that in school buildings all
exterior windows should be "cleaned inside and outside." Of particular importance
is the specific provision that: "In all schools that have Hauser window sashes, stepladders must be used from inside."
Id.
95. In its analysis of the status of implied contractual indemnity, the San Francisco Unified
court cited the following cases: Wheyerhauser S.S. Co. v. Nacirema Operating Co., 355 U.S.
563 (1958) (breach by stevedore of contract to load ship); Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956) (breach by stevedore of contract to load ship); Otis Elevator
Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 95 Colo. 99, 33 P.2d 974 (1934) (breach by elevator maintenance company of contract to install and keep elevator); Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. American Dist. Elec. Protective Co., 106 Fla. 330, 143 So. 316 (1932) (breach of contract to
maintain signal system causing injury to railroad employee); Busch & Latta Paint Co. v.
Woermann Constr. Co., 310 Mo. 419, 276 S.W. 614 (1925) (in breach of a contract to build
scaffold, court found that party who is only vicariously liable may seek indemnity from culpable party); Phoenix Bridge Co. v. Creem, 102 A.D. 354, 92 N.Y.S. 855 (1905) (breach of
contract to build bridge extension). San Francisco Unified, 162 Cal. App. 2d at 444-46, 328
P.2d at 792-93.
96. Id. at 448-49, 328 P.2d at 794.
97. The court in San Francisco Unified applied the common-law rule that barred contribution among tortfeasors. San Francisco Unified, 162 Cal. App. 2d at 443-44, 328 P.2d at 791.
The court stated: "Both parties agree that on the date of the injury to Dubay-February 6,
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San Francisco Unified exemplifies that in California the courts
avoided the bar to contribution through a breach of contract analysis. 98

While courts in other jurisdictions had taken a more quasi-tort approach,
the California courts were quite clear that they were implying the duty to

indemnify out of the parties contractual relationship. 99 It is equally clear
that the parties may not have bargained over the allocation of the implied
duty.
b.

the effect of comparative indemnity on implied contractual
indemnity in California

In 1957, the California legislature enacted several statutes providing
limited contribution rights among tortfeasors.lc° While the stated purpose of these statutes was to "lessen the harshness of [the common-law

bar to contribution],"1 ' they did not provide for the apportionment of
liability based on the respective fault of each defendant;10 2 rather, the
statutes apportioned liability on a pro-rata basis.1 3 For example, if a
plaintiff won a $100,000 judgment against two defendants, each was re-

sponsible for $50,000. Even if one defendant was ninety percent responsible for the plaintiff's injuries, he or she was only liable for fifty percent

of the judgment."° Thus, this limited contribution scheme did not allow
courts to allocate liability based on the respective fault of each defendant.

From 1957 until 1978, the California courts struggled with a variety
of indemnity theories to apportion liability to more culpable defend-

ants. 10' Often courts faced a dilemma. Under the contribution statutes,
courts were limited to splitting a judgment in half between two joint
tortfeasors, even if one was substantially more responsible than the other

for the plaintiff's injury.106 At the same time, common-law indemnity-

equitable or implied contractual-worked a total shift of liability from
1952-the law in California was that there was no right of contribution between joint
tortfeasors." Id. at 443, 328 P.2d at 791.
98. San Francisco Unified, 162 Cal. App. 2d at 448-49, 328 P.2d at 794.
99. See cases cited in supra note 95.
100. Act of Sept. 11, 1957, ch. 1700, § 1, 1957 Cal. Stat. 3076, 3076-77 (codified at CAL.
CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 875-880 (West 1980 & Supp 1989)) (superseded by American Motorcycle
Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978)).
101. See American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 601 n.7, 578 P.2d
899, 914 n.7, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182, 197 n.7 (1978) for a discusion of the rationale behind the
1957 statute.
102. Id. at 600-01, 578 P.2d at 914, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 196.
103. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 876 (West 1980).
104. Id.
105. American Motorcycle, 20 Cal. 3d at 594, 578 P.2d at 909, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 192. See
cases cited supra note 98.
106. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 876.
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one defendant to the other." 7 Thus, applying either the contribution
lead to a result harsher
statutes or an indemnity theory potentially would
08
effected.1
were
liability
of
shifting
no
if
than
The two formulations the courts most frequently applied were equitable indemnity and implied contractual indemnity. Equitable indemnity
required the courts to look at all the facts and circumstances of a particular case and shift liability to the most culpable tortfeasor l 9 Clearly a
highly discretional doctrine, its application frequently lead to the harsh,
inequitable result of one tortfeasor being liable for a total judgment.
During the twenty-year period, the courts also used implied contractual indemnity in attempting to fairly place liability among tortfeasors.1 0
After San Francisco Unified School Districtv. CaliforniaBuilding Co.,'
discussed above, a number of courts applied the theory to shift liability
when a contract existed between the litigants; however, the courts often
failed to articulate clearly the theoretical bases of their decisions. 1 2 Al' is illustrative. In Alisal, a city entered
isalSanitaryDistrictv. Kennedy 13
for Kennedy to perform engiproviding
into a contract with Kennedy
14 Kennedy was allegedly negligent in performneering work on sewers.
ing the work that lead to the spillage of sewage onto private property
adjacent to the City owned property." 5 The owners of the adjacent
16
property sued the City on a nuisance theory and recovered damages.'
Alisal involved the city's suit against Kennedy for indemnity." 7
The California Court of Appeal held that the City had successfully
stated a cause of action in implied contractual indemnity." 8 The court
107. American Motorcycle, 20 Cal. 3d at 591, 578 P.2d at 909, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 190.
108. The California Supreme Court in American Mototcycle observed that during this period California courts "struggled to find some linguistic formulation that would provide an
appropriate test for determining when the relative culpability of the parties [was] sufficiently
disparate to warrant placing the entire loss on one party and completely absolving the other."
Id.
109. See supra notes 13-21 and accompanying text.
110. See, eg., People ex rel. Dep't of Pub. Works v. Daly City Scavenger Co., 19 Cal. App.
3d 277, 96 Cal. Rptr. 669 (1971); Aerojet Gen. Corp. v. D. Zelinsky & Sons, 249 Cal. App. 2d
604, 57 Cal. Rptr. 701 (1967).
111. 162 Cal. App. 2d 434, 328 P.2d 785 (1958). See supra notes 87-99 and accompanying
text.
112. Bear Creek Planning Comm. v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 164 Cal. App. 3d 1227, 1238,
211 Cal. Rptr. 172, 179 (1985).
113. 180 Cal. App. 2d 69, 4 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1960).
114. Id. at 72, 4 Cal. Rptr. at 381.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 73, 4 Cal. Rptr. at 382.
118. Id. at 79, 4 Cal. Rptr. at 386. The court noted:
The gist of the complaint is the defendant's breach of its obligation to perform the
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relied on several cases where courts had implied the claim from a contract existing between defendants. 19 Confusingly, however, the court

also found that the facts were sufficient for a cause of action in equitable
indemnity, citing numerous cases focusing on the relationship of the defendants, rather than on the terms of the contract between them. 120 The
court ultimately stood on its contractual analysis, at the same time bolstering its conclusion
by focusing on the relationship between the City
21
1

and KennedyThe Alisal decision exemplifies that courts did not analyze implied
1 22
contractual indemnity as a doctrine distinct from equitable indemnity.

engineering work in the skillful, expert, and careful manner they had represented
they were capable of doing and the plaintiff's reliance on defendants' judgment and
knowledge in matters in which the latter were experts. Such an obligation carries
with it an implied agreement to indemnify and to discharge forseeable damages resulting to the plaintiff from the defendants' negligent performance.
Id.
119. The court in Alisal cited to the following cases: Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. v. Nacirema
Operating Co., 355 U.S. 563 (1958); Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350
U.S. 124 (1956); San Francisco Unified School Dist. v. California Bldg. Maintenance Co., 162
Cal. App. 2d 434, 328 P.2d 785 (1958). Alisal, 180 Cal. App. 2d at 78, 4 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
120. For example, the court in Alisal cited Busch & Latta Paint Co. v. Woermann Constr.
Co., 310 Mo. 419, 276 S.W. 614 (1925). Alisal, 180 Cal. App. 2d at 78, 4 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
The reasoning in Busch referred to the approach for equitable indemnity among joint
tortfeasors, not implied contractual indemnity. Busch, 310 Mo. at 422, 276 S.W. at 619-20.
The Busch court stated:
In all cases where one party creates the condition which causes the injury, and the
other does not join therein, but is exposed to liability, and suffers damages on account
of it, the rule that one of two joint tort-feasors cannot maintain an action against the
other for indemnity does not apply.
Id. at 422, 276 S.W. at 619.
The Alisal court also cited City and County of San Francisco v. Ho Sing, 51 Cal. 2d 127,
330 P.2d 802 (1958). In Ho Sing, a pedestrian was injured on a public sidewalk; he sued the
city and Ho Sing, an abutting landowner, and recovered. Id. at 128-29, 330 P.2d at 803. The
city sought indemnity from Ho Sing. Id. at 129, 330 P.2d at 803. The court in Ho Sing
allowed the claim; its reasoning is described in Alisal:
The court recognized that where a landowner makes an unusual use of the public
streets for his own benefit, with the express or implied permission of the city, such
permission carries with it the implied condition that the landowner will exercise due
care for the safety of the public and that it will hold the city harmless for any damages occasioned by the lack of due care.
Alisal, 180 Cal. App. 2d at 77, 4 Cal. Rptr. at 384.
It is clear from these two exerpts that neither the Busch nor Ho Sing courts based its
decision to indemnify on a contract theory. Nevertheless, the court in Alisal relied on these
decisions in support of its holding. Id. at 79, 4 Cal. Rptr. at 386.
121. Id.
122. See also Gardner v. Murphy, 54 Cal. App. 3d 164, 126 Cal. Rptr. 302 (1975); Niles v.
City of San Rafael, 42 Cal. App. 3d 230, 116 Cal. Rptr. 733 (1974); Kerr Chems., Inc. v.
Crown Cork & Seal Co., 21 Cal. App. 3d 1010, 99 Cal. Rptr. 162 (1971); Pearson Ford Co. v.
Ford Motor Co., 273 Cal. App. 2d 269, 78 Cal. Rptr. 279 (1969); Aerojet Gen. Corp. v. D.
Zelinsky & Sons, 249 Cal. App. 2d 604, 57 Cal. Rptr. 701 (1967); Herrero v. Atkinson, 227
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Instead, courts used the doctrine as a tool to equitably shift liability
under the guise of contract law. 123 As a result of focusing on the parties'
relationship rather than the terms of their contract, the courts ignored
1 24
the manner in which the parties had agreed to allocate risk.
25
1978 brought American Motorcycle Association v. Superior Court 1
and a radical change in California contribution and indemnity law. In
American Motorcycle, the California Supreme Court adopted a rule of
comparative indemnity, under which liability may be apportioned among
joint tortfeasors proportionate to their respective degrees of culpability. 126 The facts of American Motorcycle provide a good example. There,
a boy participating in a cross-country motorcycle race for novices, sustained severe injuries during the race. 127 The boy sued the organizers of
the race for negligently designing, managing and supervising the race; the
organizers then filed a cross-complaint for proportionate indemnity
against the boy's parents for negligent supervision of the child.' 21 Under
comparative indemnity, if the trial court had found that the organizers
were ninety percent responsible for the boy's injury and 1the
parents ten
29
percent, liability would have been allocated accordingly.
The American Motorcycle court was careful to reconcile its recognition of comparative indemnity with 1957 contribution statutes. 3 ' The
court stated that both the terms of the statutes and their legislative history indicated that the statutes' pro-rata contribution formula was
subordinate to equitable rights of indemnity.' 3 ' Thus, comparative equitable indemnity supplanted contribution in California.
Given that American Motorcycle allows courts to allocate liability
based on proportionate responsiblity for an injury, it is clear that the
need for total equitable indemnity is gone. Therefore, the same should be
true for implied contractual indemnity. Implied contractual indemnity is
Cal. App. 2d 69, 38 Cal. Rptr. 490 (1964); Cahill Bros. Inc. v. Clementina Co., 208 Cal. App.
2d 367, 25 Cal. Rptr. 301 (1962).
123. San Francisco Unified School Dist. v. California Bldg. Co., 162 Cal. App. 2d 434, 44849, 328 P.2d 785, 794 (1958).
124. Id.
125. 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978).
126. Id. at 582, 578 P.2d at 902, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 185.
127. Id. at 584, 578 P.2d at 902, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 185.
128. Id. at 584-85, 578 P.2d at 903, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 186.
129. In American Motorcycle the trial court denied the defendants leave to file complaint
because California did not recognize comparative indemnity; the court of appeal granted a
preemptory writ of mandate; the supreme court granted review and then issued a writ of mandate to the trial court to allow the cross-complaint and proceed consistently with the opinion.
Id. at 586, 578 P.2d at 903, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 186.
130. Id at 598-604, 578 P.2d at 912-16, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 195-99.
131. Id. at 599-607, 578 P.2d at 912-18, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 195-201.
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not grounded in contract law, but rather, is really just a sub-species of
equitable indemnity.132 It is an equitable tool clothed in contract law.
Since equitable indemnity was eradicated by the adoption of comparative
133

equitable indemnity, so too should be implied contractual indemnity.
3. The effect of comparative indemnity on implied contractual
indemnity in New York

New York courts have been less willing to hold that the adoption of
comparative indemnity means that implied contractual indemnity is no
longer a viable doctrine. 134 In Dole v. Dow Chemical Co., 135 New York

abandoned equitable indemnity for the first time and permitted comparative indemnity among joint tortfeasors. Prior to Dole, the development
of indemnity rules in New York was very similar to California. In 1928,
New York adopted Section 211 of the Civil Practice Act which provided
limited contribution on a pro-rata basis. 136 In addition, like California,
New York also developed
equitable indemnity principles to shift loss
7
among defendants.

13

Like California, New York has now abandoned total equitable indemnity and adopted a system of comparative indemnity.1 3 8 At the same

time, New York has retained the rights of parties to establish indemnity
arrangements among themselves which will override the court's apportionment of liability.1 39 The issue in New York thus becomes whether
implied contractual indemnity is an equitable doctrine rendered useless
by the adoption of comparative indemnity, or whether implied contrac-

tual indemnity actually represents the efforts of parties to allocate risk.
132. See Stratton v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 190 Cal. App. 3d 286, 235 Cal. Rptr.
374 (1987); see also IRM Corp. v. Carlson, 179 Cal. App. 3d 94, 224 Cal. Rptr. 438 (1986);
Kramer v. Cedu Found. Inc., 93 Cal. App. 3d 1, 155 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1979).
133. See infra note 219 and accompanying text.
134. McDermott v. City of New York, 50 N.Y.2d 211, 406 N.E.2d 460, 428 N.Y.S.2d 643
(1980); Riviello v. Waldron, 47 N.Y.2d 297, 391 N.E.2d 1278, 418 N.Y.S.2d 300 (1979); Rock
v. Reed-Prentice Div. of Package Mach. Co., 39 N.Y.2d 34, 346 N.E.2d 520, 382 N.Y.S.2d.720
(1976).
135. 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972).
136. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L & R, ch. 308 (Consol. 1928). This rule was similar to the 1958
California statute discussed supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text. Like the California
rule, the New York statute provided contribution only on a pro-rata basis and did not apportion loss based on the relative liability of the defendants. See Board of Educ. v. Sargent, 71
N.Y.2d 21, 26, 517 N.E.2d 1360, 1363, 523 N.Y.S.2d 475, 477 (1987). In addition, the statute
only applied to defendants sued by the plaintiff; thus those defendants who were never sued by
the plaintiff could not be required to contribute to the judgment. Id.
137. See McDermott, 50 N.Y.2d at 214, 406 N.E.2d at 462, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 645-46 (1980).
138. Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972).
See supra notes 125-33 for a discussion of American Motorcycle.
139. See McDermott, 50 N.Y.2d at 214, 406 N.E.2d at 462, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 645-46 (1980).
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The New York courts consistently hold that there is a clear distinction between implied contractual indemnity and comparative indemnity."4 However, the language often used to describe implied
contractual indemnity closely resembles California's old equitable indemnity doctrine which allocates liability based on the relationship of the
parties. 14 1 The New York courts speak of "placing the obligation [to
indemnify] where in equity it belongs." 14 2 Specifically, New York has
often used "unjust enrichment" as the theoretical basis for implying a
quasi-contractual indemnity promise. 43 The courts argue that "where
payment by one person is compelled, which another should have made[,]
144 These
... a contract to reimburse or [indemnify] is implied by law."'

views indicate that implied contractual indemnity as a tool used by
courts to allocate risk as they see fit; the views do not indicate that the
courts are overriding the doctrine of comparative indemnity because the
parties have expressly contracted for indemnity. Under New York law,
as under California law, implied contractual indemnity should no longer
be recognized as a viable doctrine.
4. California and New York law compared

New York case law consistently finds that implied contractual indemnity is distinct from comparative indemnity and therefore survives
the Dole decision. 4 5 The California courts, on the other hand, have
formed into two schools about whether implied contractual indemnity
has survived the recognition of comparative indemnity.'4 6 One school
holds that implied contractual indemnity has been subsumed in compar140. See id.
141. See id. In fact, under New York law, there appears to be no clear distinction between
total equitable indemnity and implied contractual indemnity. Id. Generally, when courts apply implied contractual indemnity they looked to the contractual obligations between the parties and conclude that those obligations create an implied duty to indemnify for foreseeable
liabilities to third parties. See Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124,
133 (1956). However, the New York rule appears to use an implied contract as a vehicle for
implementing their equitable indemnity principles. See, e.g., Dunn v. Uvalde Asphalt Paving
Co., 175 N.Y. 214, 217-18, 67 N.E. 439, 441 (1903); Oceanic Steam Nay. Co. v. Compania
Transatlantica Espanola, 134 N.Y. 461, 465-68, 31 N.E. 987, 989 (1892). Given this blurring
of the two theories it would seem that New York has no need for total equitable indemnity
with the adoption of comparative indemnity.
142. McDermott, 50 N.Y.2d at 214,406 N.E.2d at 462, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 646; see also Dunn,
175 N.Y. at 217-18, 67 N.E. at 439 (1903); OceanicSteam, 134 N.Y. at 465-68, 31 N.E. at 987.
143. McDermott, 50 N.Y.2d at 214, 406 N.E.2d at 462, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 646.
144. Brown v. Rosenbaum, 287 N.Y. 510, 518-19, 41 N.E.2d 77, 81 (1942); see also Dunn,
175 N.Y. at 217-18, 67 N.E. at 439.
145. See McDermott, 50 N.Y.2d at 214, 406 N.E.2d at 462, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 646.
146. See id.
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ative indemnity. 147 These decisions note that a central purpose in the
American Motorcycle decision was the avoidance of the harsh results of
the all-or-nothing effect of the total equitable indemnity doctrines. 148 In

Kramer v. Cedu Foundation, Inc., 49 for example, the court of appeal
stated that the inability of California courts to formulate a fair system of

apportioning loss led to the decision in American Motorcycle.15 0 According to the Kramer court, by rejecting equitable indemnity the supreme

court in American Motorcycle also rejected implied contractual indemnity.1 51 In other words, Kramer interpreted American Motorcycle as representing a rejection of the harsh effects of indemnity, whether it is called
equitable indemnity or implied contractual indemnity. 52
The other view in California mirrors the New York approach to

implied contractual indemnity, arguing that it is theoretically distinct
from equitable indemnity and consequently was not subsumed by the

American Motorcycle comparative indemnity rule. 153 For example, in
Bear Creek Planning Committee v. Title Insurance & Trust Co., 15 the
court argued that:

The right to implied contractualindemnity rests upon entirely
different grounds [than does the right to equitable indemnity].

Where the right of implied indemnity arises from a contractual
relationship between the indemnitor and the indemnitee, it is
predicated upon the indemnitor's breach of such contract, the
rationale of the cases being that a contract under which the
indemnitor undertook to do work or perform services necessarily implied an obligation to do the work involved in a proper
manner and to discharge foreseeable damages resulting from

improper performance absent any participation by the indemni55
tee in the wrongful act precluding recovery.1

147. See IRM Corp. v. Carlson, 179 Cal. App. 3d 94, 224 Cal. Rptr. 438 (1986); Kramer v.
Cedu Found., Inc., 93 Cal. App. 3d 1, 155 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1979).
148. See Kramer, 93 Cal. App. 3d at 12-13, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 558.
149. 93 Cal. App. 3d 1, 155 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1979).
150. Id. at 12-13, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 558 (citing American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior
Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978)).
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. See, eg., County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 155 Cal. App. 3d 798, 202 Cal.
Rptr. 444 (1984); Bear Creek Planning Comm. v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 164 Cal. App. 3d
1227, 211 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1985). For a detailed discussion of Bear Creek see infra notes 195203. See also Great West. Furniture Co. v. Porter Corp., 238 Cal. App. 2d 502, 48 Cal. Rptr.
76 (1965) (finding that implied contractual indemnity is theoretically different from implied
indemnity).
154. 164 Cal. App. 3d 1227, 211 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1985).
155. Id. at 1237, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 178 (emphasis in original).
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Thus, some California courts adhere to the position that implied
contractual indemnity is theoretically distinct from and has survived the
modem law of comparative equitable indemnity.156 However, as the
next section reveals, even assuming that implied contractual indemnity is
a distinct doctrine, it is theoretically infirm as a contract doctrine and
should be abandoned on that basis.
B.

Implied ContractualIndemnity and Contract Principles

Implied contractual indemnity is inconsistent with modem contract
law for several reasons. These reasons relate to the elements required to
establish a cause of action for implied contractual indemnity. Elements
generally necessary for a party to state a cause of action for implied contractual indemnity include: a contract, a foreseeable injury, and minimal
participation in perpetrating the wrong.
There are several problems with the application of these elements.
First, the type of contract that will support a claim for implied contractual indemnity is unclear. Second, implied contractual indemnity unreasonably expands the scope of foreseeable damages for breach of contract.
Third, because implied contractual indemnity is so intimately tied to equitable indemnity, whether a party may lose his or her right to indemnity
through some participation in the injury is unclear. These problems are
examined in the following analysis.
1. Types of contracts from which indemnity may be implied
There are several types of contracts from which a claim for implied
contractual indemnity may arise. If there is no contract, then liability is
apportioned according to each defendant's respective responsibility for
the injury to the plaintiff under a contribution statute or comparative
equitable indemnity.1" 7
a. express or implied contract
The first issue is whether the contract must be express or whether it
may be implied. In other words, in a situation where a court finds it
equitable to imply a contract between two parties, will such an implied
contract in turn support an implied indemnity claim? California requires
that there be express contractual language before a duty to indemnify
156. See County of Los Angeles, 155 Cal. App. 3d at 803, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 447; Bear Creek,
164 Cal. App. 3d at 1237, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 178.
157. See supra notes 22-27 and accompanying text.
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will be implied.'5 8 Thus, in California, the court must look at the language of the contract to determine if it supports requiring one party to
indemnify another.
In contrast, in New York, an implied contract might support an
implied duty to indemnify.' 5 9 As previously noted, the New York approach to indemnity is a blend of California's "equitable indemnity" and
"implied contractual indemnity."'" New York courts use an "unjust

enrichment" analysis to determine whether one party is unfairly shouldering the burden of liability; a court may create a quasi-contract, shift16 1
ing the burden to the party the court believes should carry the burden.
Thus, the New York and California approaches are markedly differ-

ent. In shifting liability, New York's "unjust enrichment" approach focuses on the status and relationship of the parties. 162 Thus, a contract
may be one element in the analysis. However, in California, the focus is
on the contract itself, and the issue is whether it is appropriate to imply
an indemnity obligation to one party based on the language of the
63

contract.1

b.

the effect of express indemnity provisions

A second issue that arises in the contract element is what effect express indemnity provisions have on the willingness of courts to imply

further duties to indemnify. It is a general rule of contract interpretation
158. E.L. White, Inc. v. City of Huntington Beach, 21 Cal. 3d 497, 506-07, 579 P.2d 505,
510, 146 Cal. Rptr. 614, 619 (1978) ("The obligation of indemnity... [fJirst ...may arise by
virtue of express contractual language ....Second it may find its source in equitable considerations brought into play.., by contractuallanguage not specifically dealing with indemnification ... .") (emphasis in original). California's approach continues to mirror the rule in Ryan
Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corp., 350 U.S. 124, 133 (1956). The Ryan Court
looked at the respective obligations and determined that it was fair to imply into their contract
the duty of the stevadore to indemnify the shipowner. Id. This approach is analytically similar to the "omitted term" analysis, which holds that it is appropriate for a court to imply a
term into a contract when a dispute arises for which the contract provides no answer. See
generally E. FARNSWORTH, CoNTRACTS §§ 7.15-.16 (1982).
159. See McDermott v. City of New York, 50 N.Y.2d 211, 214, 406 N.E.2d 460, 462, 428
N.Y.S.2d 643, 646 (1980).
160. The New York approach does not seem to fall within the "omitted term" analysis
described by Professor Farnsworth; see E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 158, § 7.15, at 451-52;
the New York approach does not imply a term into an existing contract. Rather, it uses the
theory of an implied contract to allocate the liability to the party where the court believes it is
most equitable. See McDermott v. City of New York, 50 N.Y.2d 211, 214, 406 N.E.2d 460,
462, 428 N.Y.S.2d 643, 646 (1980).
161. See id. at 214, 406 N.E.2d at 462, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 646.
162. See id.
163. San Francisco Unified School Dist. v. California Bldg. Co., 162 Cal. App. 2d 434,43637, 328 P.2d 785, 787 (1958).

June 1989]

IMPLIED CONTRACTUAL INDEMNITY

1251

that if a contract speaks to a particular issue, what is said in the contract
Accordwill be viewed as the parties' full intent regarding that issue.'
ingly, this rule has been applied in the case of express indemnity agreements. In County of Alameda v. Southern Pacific Co., 6 ' the court found
that:
Where parties have entered into written engagements which industriously express the obligations which each is to assume, the
courts should be reluctant to enlarge them by implication as to
important matters. The presumption is that having expressed
all of the conditions by which they insome they have express
166
tended to be bound.
This rule is not without exception, especially in the area of implied
contractual indemnity.16 7 After noting the general rule of contract interpretation as described above, the California Supreme Court stated in
E.L. White, Inc. v. City of Huntington Beach,'6 8 that "[w]hen ... the
duty established by contract is by the terms and conditions of its creation
inapplicable to the particular factual setting before the court, the equita169
ble principles of implied indemnity may indeed come into play."'
This exception was used in People ex rel. Department of Public
Works v. Daly City Scavenger Co. 170 In Daly, the City, after closing off a
portion of a highway executed a contract allowing a scavenger company
to enter the enclosed area. 17 1 The company expressly agreed to indemnify the city for damages paid to anyone who was injured using the enclosed area within the purposes of the agreement. 172 The company
further agreed not to indemnify the city for any injuries to a person using
the enclosed area for his or her own purposes. 173 The company subsequently erected a chain barrier outside the enclosed area. 174 When two
persons, using the road for their own purposes, were killed colliding with
the barrier, the city sought indemnity from the company. 175 The court
164. See E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 158, § 7.3.
165. 55 Cal. 2d 479, 360 P.2d 327, 11 Cal. Rptr. 751 (1961).
166. Id. at 488, 360 P.2d at 333, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 757 (quoting Foley v. Euless, 214 Cal. 506,
512, 6 P.2d 956, 958 (1931)); see also Loyalton Elec. Light Co. v. California Co., 22 Cal. App.
75, 77, 133 P. 323, 324 (1913).
167. EL. White, 21 Cal. 3d at 510, 579 P.2d at 513, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 622.
168. 21 Cal. 3d 497, 579 P.2d 505, 146 Cal. Rptr. 614 (1978).
169. Id. at 508, 579 P.2d at 511-12, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 620-21.
170. 19 Cal. App. 3d 277, 96 Cal. Rptr. 669 (1971).
171. Id. at 279-80, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 670.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id., 96 Cal. Rptr. at 670-71.
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ruled that the express indemnity provision clearly did not apply, since
17 6
the injured people had been using the road for their own purposes.
However, the court also ruled that because the accident did not occur
within the enclosed area, the express indemnity provision did not necessarily preempt other implied or equitable indemnity rights that the city
might have. 177
The analysis of whether an express indemnity provision will preempt any rights to implied contractual indemnity appears to involve
three steps.1 78 First, the court must determine the scope of the express
indemnity provision. Second, the court must examine the act that caused
liability to determine if it falls outside the scope of the indemnity provision. Third, if the court determines that, "the scope of the express indemnity clause agreed to by the parties did not extend to the
circumstances which subsequently arose and led to liability," 179 then the
express clause will not preempt a party's rights to implied indemnity.
This approach necessarily provides a court with wide discretion. It
would be theoretically possible for a court to conclude that the scope of
an indemnity agreement included all rights of indemnity. Such an interpretation would preempt any implied rights arising from the contract.
In California, an interpretation that strictly limits indemnity rights
to the scope of an express provision would be consistent with California's
adoption of comparative indemnity. Implied contractual indemnity by
definition is a harsh doctrine. When a court grants this type of indemnity, it shifts the entire liability from one party to another.18 0 Thus, absent an express provision, courts should not resort to implied contractual
indemnity now that comparative indemnity can be used to apportion liability among tortfeasors.
2.

Foreseeability

When a court infers a duty to indemnify from a contract silent on
the point, it unwarrantedly expands the narrow scope of the contract
doctrine of foreseeability of damages by adding in expansive notions of
foreseeability in tort liability. Normally, an aggrieved party to a contract
is entitled only to general damages and to damages that the parties at the
time of contracting contemplate could foreseeably flow from a breach176. Id., 96 Cal. Rptr. at 671.
177. Id. at 281, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 671.
178. Id.; E.L. White, 21 Cal. 3d at 508, 579 P.2d at 511-12, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 620-21.
179. EL White, 21 Cal. 3d at 510, 579 P.2d at 513, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 622.
180. American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 591, 578 P.2d 899, 909,
146 Cal. Rptr. 182, 190 (1978).
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"consequential damages." 18 1 This foreseeability-of-damages concept is
more limited in scope than the foreseeability doctrine of liability in tort.
In tort, foreseeability is not constrained by what the person involved
could be said to have contemplated, but rather by the legal constructs of
"duty" and "proximate cause."'" 2
The "foreseeable damages" doctrine could be applied to the typical
case of implied contractual indemnity; the foreseeable damages are the
non-breaching party's potential liability to a third party. Assume A con-

tracts with B so that B must perform a task. In performing the task, B
injures C. Later, C sues A and recovers. If C's suit against A is deter-

mined to be a foreseeable result of B's improper performance of the contract, then the amount A has been required to pay C is a damage which A

may recover from B. However, courts do not treat this situation as an
ordinary damages issue. Instead, when this situation arises, courts often
18 3
imply a duty on the part of B to completely indemnify A.
Implying a duty to indemnify is significantly different from viewing
the breach from a pure damages perspective. Under the damages perspective, a court must determine specifically whether the damage was
foreseeable. However, if a court uses implied contractual indemnity, it in
effect begins by defining the damages as foreseeable. Thus, implying a

duty to indemnify broadens the traditional, limited contract view of
84
foreseeability.1
181. See E. FARNswoRTH, supra note 158, § 12.14, at 874. The Restatement (Second) of
Contracts defines the scope of contract damages as follows: "Damages are not recoverable for
loss that the party in breach did not have reason to foresee as a probable result of the breach
when the contract was made." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 351(1) (1981).
Professor Farnsworth summarizes the elements of foreseeabilty as follows:
In spite of the vagueness of the concept of foreseeability, a few general propositions can be asserted with some assurance. First, foreseeability is to be determined as
of the time of the making of the contract and is unaffected by events subsequent to
that time. The question is not what was foreseeable at the time of the breach, but
what was foreseeable at the time of contracting. Second, what must be foreseeable is
only that the loss would result if the breach occurred. There is no requirement that
the breach itself or the particular way that the loss came about be foreseeable. Third,
it is foreseeability only by the party in breach that is determinative.... Fourth,
forseeability has an objective character. A contracting party takes the risk not only
of those consequences that he actually did foresee, but also of those that he ought
reasonably to have foreseen. Fifth, the loss need only have been foreseeable as a
probable, as opposed to a necessary or certain, result of the breach. The mere circumstance that some loss was foreseeable, however, may not suffice to impose liability for a type of loss that was so unusual as not to be foreseeable.
E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 158, § 12.14, at 877-78 (footnotes omitted).
182. W. KEETON, supra note 5, §§ 41-44.
183. See Ryan, 350 U.S. at 133; San Francisco Unified, 162 Cal. App. 2d at 436-37, 328
P.2d at 787.
184. This section of the Comment focuses on the effect implying indemnity has on
foreseeabilty. However, there are many other areas where creating the implied duty to indem-
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For example, in Weyerhaeuser Steamship Co. v. Nacirema Co., 18 a
shipowner (Weyerhaeuser) hired Nacirema to provide stevedoring serv-

ices.186 A longshoreman employed by Nacirema was injured while unloading a ship owned by Weyerhaeuser when a piece of lumber fell from

a temporary winch shelter designed to protect the winch driver from the
elements.1 87 The longshoreman sued and recovered a judgment from

Weyerhaeuser.I88 Weyerhaeuser sought indemnity from Nacirema, relying on the following contract language: Nacirema agrees, "to faithfully
furnish such stevedoring services as may be required," and to provide all

necessary labor and supervision for "the proper and efficient conduct of
the work."18' 9 Relying on Ryan, Weyerhaeuser argued that the breach of
the contract had caused the injury and that the resulting liability was
"foreseeable."' 0
Unlike in Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corp.,19 '

where the worker had been injured by handling cargo, an act specifically
contemplated within the contract, the longshoreman in Weyerhaeuser
was injured by equipment incidental to the performance of the con-

tract-the falling piece of lumber.192 Even though the injury to the longshoreman in Weyerhaeuser was caused by equipment merely incidental to
the actual performance of the contract, the court ruled that Nacirema
nify has an impact. First, manufacturing an indemnity obligation has allowed courts to circumvent statutes that would have otherwise barred a simple damages action. See Ryan, 350
U.S. at 133. Second, creating the implied indemnity has provided courts with greater freedom
to manipulate the respective liabilities of the parties without having to justify their actions
based on how the parties may have contractually allocated the risk of loss among themselves.
See Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. American Dist. Elec. Protective Co., 106 Fla. 330, 143 So.
316 (1932); Busch & Latta Paint Co. v. Woermann Constr. Co., 310 Mo. 419, 276 S.W. 614
(1925); Phoenix Bridge Co. v. Creem, 102 A.D. 354, 92 N.Y.S. 855 (1905). While this manipulation may have been justified when courts were without any vehicle for apportioning liability
according to fault, it is unjustified where states allow comparative indemnity. It is clearly
more consistent with traditional contract law to view the A, B and C situation as one involving
consequential damages rather than one involving the implication of an indemnity duty.
185. 355 U.S. 563 (1958). Weyerhaeuserwas decided by the Supreme Court two years after
its landmark decision in Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corp., 350 U.S. 124
(1956).
186. Weyerhaeuser, 355 U.S. at 564.
187. Id. at 565-66.
188. Id. at 565.
189. Id.
190. Id. (citing Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corp., 350 U.S. 124
(1956)).
191. 350 U.S 124 (1956). In Ryan, the worker was injured when rolls of pulp which had
been improperly stowed broke loose and struck him. Ryan, 350 U.S. at 126. See also supra
notes 72-83 and accompanying text.
192. Weyerhaeuser, 355 U.S. at 566-67.
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could have foreseen Weyerhaeuser's liability."' 3
The Weyerhaeuser Court could have approached this case from a
pure "consequential damages" perspective and reached the same conclusion. However, by implying a duty to indemnify, the Court took a
broader view of foreseeability of damages and included injuries caused by
incidental equipment within that scope. 194 Thus, Weyerhaeuser moves
implied contractual indemnity closer to a tort liability standard of foreseeability of harm.
The California Court of Appeal in Bear Creek PlanningCommittee
v. Title Insurance & Trust Co.,195 unabashadely used a tort concept of
foreseeability of harm in defining the scope of damages for a party that
had breached a contract. 196 In Bear Creek, the plaintiff, a homeowner's
association (Association) charged with the responsibility of overseeing
and enforcing the covenants, conditions and restrictions (CC & R's) for a
housing division near Lake Tahoe,19 7 sought indemnity from a title insurance company (Company).19 A homeowner in the development began building a structure in violation of the CC & R's. 199 When the
Association attempted to stop the homeowner from completing the
structure, the homeowner sued for slander of title and recovered judgment. 2 ° Apparently, the Company hired by the Association had failed
to record the restrictions.2 °1
The Association sought implied contractual indemnity from the
Company.20 2 In its analysis of foreseeability, the court discussed notions
of tort, not contract:
Tort principles do come into play in the sense of foreseeability in that the indemnitor's breach of contract must
foreseeably result in the indemnitee being liable for damages to
the injured third party....
The trial court herein found [the Company] was contractually bound to record the CC & Rs . . . and breached this
contract when it failed to do so. The damage suffered by [the
Homeowners Association] in being found liable for slander of
193. Id. at 566-68.

194. Id.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

164 Cal. App. 3d 1227, 211 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1985).
Id. at 1240-41, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 180-81.
Id. at 1233, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 176.
Id. at 1235, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 177.
Id. at 1234, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 176.
Id. at 1235, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 177.
Id.
Id. at 1236, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 177.
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title was clearly a foreseeable result of this breach. . .. In
[bringing the action against the homeowner for building the
structure] the [Association] was fulfilling its own obligations on
the contract. Accordingly, it was foreseeable that [the Association] would attempt to enforce the CC & Rs and thereby be
exposed to liability for falsely disparaging the [homeowner's]
title.2 o3
The Bear Creek court's creation of a chain of causation as a test for foreseeability shows that courts use implied contractual indemnity to avoid
the traditional limits on consequential damages. Simply put, if the Bear
Creek court had been limited to traditional notions of contract damages,
it would have had to examine the language of the contract to determine
whether the injury was within the scope of foreseeability. However,
under the implied contractual indemnity approach, the court is able to
use a much more expanded tort-based view of foreseeability.
3.

The degree of participation in the injury by the party seeking
indemnity

During the twenty years between the adoption of contribution in
California and the decision in American Motorcycle, California courts applying total equitable indemnity often assigned liability by distinguishing
between "active" negligence and "passive" negligence."
In Atchison,
Topeka & Santa Fe Railroad Co. v. Lan Franco,2° s the court described
the confusing number of approaches as follows:
The cases are not always helpful in determining whether equitable indemnity lies. The test[s] utilized in applying the doctrine are vague. Some authorities characterize the negligence of
the indemnitor as 'active,' 'primary,' or 'positive,' and the negligence of the indemnitee as 'passive,' 'secondary,' or 'negative,'. . .. Other authorities indicate that the application of the
doctrine depends on whether the claimant's liability is 'primary,' 'secondary,' or 'derivative.'... These formulations have
203. Id. at 1240-41, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 180-81.
204. American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 594, 578 P.2d 899, 909,
146 Cal. Rptr. 182, 192 (1978); see also Gardner v. Murphy, 54 Cal. App. 3d 164, 126 Cal.
Rptr. 302 (1975); Niles v. City of San Rafael, 42 Cal. App. 3d 230, 116 Cal. Rptr. 733 (1974);
Kerr Chems., Inc. v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 21 Cal. App. 3d 1010, 99 Cal. Rptr. 162 (1971);
Pearson Ford Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 273 Cal. App. 2d 269, 78 Cal. Rptr. 279 (1969); Aerojet
Gen. Corp. v. D. Zelinsky & Sons, 249 Cal. App. 2d 604, 57 Cal. Rptr. 701 (1967); Herrero v.
Atkinson, 227 Cal. App. 2d 69, 38 Cal. Rptr. 490 (1964); Cahill Bros. Inc. v. Clementina Co.,
208 Cal. App. 2d 367, 25 Cal. Rptr. 301 (1962).
205. 267 Cal. App. 2d 881, 73 Cal. Rptr. 660 (1968).
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been criticized as being artificial and as lacking the objective
criteria desirable for predictability in the law.2 "6
Although the American Motorcycle court abandoned these approaches when it superceded total equitable indemnity with comparative
equitable indemnity,2 "7 the formulations still can play a part in the analysis of implied contractual indemnity. 0 8 In Bear Creek the court summed
up the current status of the "active," "passive," rules with respect to
implied contractual indemnity:
The degree of an indemnitee's participation in the indemnitor's
wrong may be sufficient to preclude recovery on the implied
contract theory .... A mere finding of negligence on the part
of the indemnitee in the underlying action does not per se preclude recovery from the indemnitor on implied contract as the
duties owing from the indemnitee to the injured party are not
necessarily the same as the duties owing from the indemnitor to
the indemnitee.2 °9
Thus, some courts still try to draw the same fine line that created so
much confusion in the area of equitable indemnity. The difficulty with
equitable indemnity was that once the line was drawn and indemnity was
allowed, the burden of the judgment shifted entirely. Therefore, deciding where to draw the line was a difficult task. This holds true for implied contractual indemnity as well. It is very difficult to determine at
what point a party to a contract participates sufficiently in creating an
injury such that the implied duty to indemnify should or should not be
implied.
4.

Summary

Implied contractual indemnity should be abandoned as a tool for
allocating the risk of loss among parties to a lawsuit. It has failed as a
device to efficiently and fairly allocate loss.2 10 Furthermore, there already exist two means of allocating loss which can readily replace implied contractual indemnity. First, if implied contractual indemnity is
simply thought of as a form of equitable indemnity,2 11 loss can be allo206. Id. at 886, 73 Cal. Rptr at 664 (citations omitted).
207. American Motorcycle, 20 Cal. 3d at 598, 578 P.2d at 912, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 195.
208. See Cahill Bros., Inc. v. Clementina Co., 208 Cal. App. 2d 367, 25 Cal. Rptr. 301
(1962).
209. Bear Creek, 164 Cal. App. 3d at 1241, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 181.
210. See supra notes 181-203 and accompanying text.
211. See, e.g., IRM Corp. v. Carlson, 179 Cal. App. 3d 94, 224 Cal. Rptr. 438 (1986);
Kramer v. Cedu Found. Inc., 93 Cal. App. 3d 1, 155 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1979).
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cated under the American Motorcycle Association v. Superior Court2 12 or
Dole v. Dow Chemical Co.2 13 comparative indemnity schemes. Second, if

a party has been forced to pay damages that can be described as "foreseeable" under traditional contract "expectancy" notions, then that party
can seek to recover under a simple breach of contract action.214 With
these legal tools at the court's disposal, implied contractual indemnity
should be abandoned as a means of allocating risk.
C. Implied ContractualIndemnity and Settlement-bar Statutes

1. Present law
Implied contractual indemnity evolved as a way for courts to avoid
what they perceived as the harsh effects of the historical bar to contribu-

tion among tortfeasors.21 5 With the adoption of comparative indemnity
in California,2" 6 it would seem that the need for implied contractual indemnity has evaporated. However, just as implied contractual indemnity

was used to avoid the contribution bar, it is currently used to avoid California's "good faith" settlement-bar statute. 21 7 California Civil Proce-

dure Code section 877.6(c) was adopted almost immediately after the
decision in American Motorcycle.2"' The California Legislature sought to
codify the notion in American Motorcycle that suggested that if one multiple defendant settled with the plaintiff, the settling defendant would be
immunized from indemnity claims brought by the non-settling defend-

ants.219 Civil Procedure Code section 877.6(c) provides:
212. 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978).
213. 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972).
214. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 41-86 and accompanying text.
216. American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal.
Rptr. 182 (1978).
217. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877.6(c) (West 1980 & Supp. 1989).
218. Act of July 17, 1980, ch. 562, § 1, 1980 Cal. Stat. 1549 (codified at CAL. CIv. PROC.
CODE § 877.6(c) (West 1980 & Supp. 1989)).
219. The court in American Motorcycle noted that,
while we recognize that section 877, by its terms, releases a settling tortfeasor only
from liability for contribution and not partial indemnity, we conclude that from a
realistic perspective the legislative policy underlying the provision dictates that a
tortfeasor who has entered into a "good faith" settlement ... with the plaintiff must
also be discharged from any claim for partialor comparative indemnity that may be
pressed by a concurrenttortfeasor.
American Motorcycle, 20 Cal. 3d at 604, 578 P.2d at 915, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 198 (emphasis
added).
It is interesting to note that the language used by the court in American Motorcycle does
not say that claims for implied contractual indemnity are barred by a "good faith" settlement.
However, in a recent decision, the court did not feel constrained by the language in American
Motorcycle in holding that claims for "total equitable indemnity" were barred by a good faith
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A determination by the court that the settlement was made in
good faith shall bar any other joint tortfeasor or co-obligor
from any further claims against the settling tortfeasor or coobligor for equitable comparative contribution, or partial or
comparative indemnity, based on comparative negligence or
220
comparativefault.
Since the language of the statute does not mention implied contractual indemnity, a number of cases have found that a "good faith" settlement does not protect a settling defendant against claims for implied
contractual indemnity. 221 For example, in County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court,222 a construction company hired to build a medical center
sued the County and the architect to recover lost costs caused by delays
in completing the project. 223 The company alleged that the County had
provided inaccurate and defective plans and that the architect was negli224
gent in their preparation. The company had based its bid on the plans.

The County filed a cross-complaint against the architect for implied contractual indemnity, arguing that any liability it had was the result of the

architect's negligence.225

settlement under section 877.6(c). Far W. Fin. Corp. v. D & S Co., 46 Cal. 3d 796, 817, 760
P.2d 399, 413, 251 Cal. Rptr. 202, 216 (1988). Before the issue was settled whether a claim for
total equitable indemnity survived a good faith settlement under section 877.6, there had been
considerable disagreement among the California Courts of Appeal. A number of cases held
that a section 877.6 "good faith" settlement barred a "total equitable indemnity" claim. See
Horton v. Superior Court, 194 Cal. App. 3d 735, 238 Cal. Rptr. 467 (1987); Standard Pac. of
San Diego v. N.A. Baxter Corp., 176 Cal. App. 3d 577, 222 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1987); IRM Corp.
v. Carlson, 179 Cal. App. 3d 94,224 Cal. Rptr. 438 (1986); Torres v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 157
Cal. App. 3d 499, 203 Cal. Rptr. 825 (1984); Lopez v. Blecher, 143 Cal. App. 3d 736, 192 Cal.
Rptr. 190 (1983); Turcon Constr., Inc. v. Norton-Villiers, Ltd., 139 Cal. App. 3d 280, 188 Cal.
Rptr. 580 (1983); Kohn v. Superior Court, 142 Cal. App. 3d 323, 191 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1983);
City of Sacramento v. Gemsch Inv. Co., 115 Cal. App. 3d 869, 171 Cal. Rptr. 764 (1981). On
the other hand, a number of cases held that a section 877.6 "good faith" settlement did not bar
a "total equitable indemnity" claim. See Tulco, Inc. v. Narmco Materials, Inc., 191 Cal. App.
3d 116, 236 Cal. Rptr. 224 (1987); Angelus Assoc. v. Neonex Leisure Prod., Inc., 167 Cal.
App. 3d 532, 213 Cal. Rptr. 403 (1985); Huizar v. Abex Corp., 156 Cal. App. 3d 534, 203 Cal.
Rptr. 47 (1984); E.L. White, Inc. v. City of Huntington Beach, 138 Cal. App. 3d 366, 187 Cal.
Rptr. 879 (1982).
220. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877.6(c) (emphasis added).
221. See, eg., Bear Creek Planning Comm. v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 164 Cal. App. 3d
1227, 211 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1985); County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 155 Cal. App. 3d
798, 202 Cal. Rptr. 444 (1984). Contra Stratton v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 190 Cal.
App. 3d 286, 235 Cal. Rptr. 374 (1987); IRM Corp., 179 Cal. App. 3d at 94, 224 Cal. Rptr. at
438.
222. 155 Cal. App. 3d 798, 202 Cal. Rptr. 444 (1984).
223. Id. at 800, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 445.
224. Id.
225. Id., 202 Cal. Rptr. at 445-46.
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After settling with the company, the architect sought to dismiss the
County's cross-complaint on the theory that it was barred by section
877.6(c).22 6 The court held that the County's cross-complaint was not
barred by section 877.6(c) because the County was not a joint tortfeasor,
and thus, did not fall within the scope of section 877.6(c). 22 7 More importantly, the court held that "sections [877 and 877.6(c)] do not operate
to bar otherwise valid claims for express or implied indemnity arising out
228
of a contractual relationship.
An entirely different view has been expressed in other California decisions. 2 29 For example, in Stratton v. Peat,Marwick, Mitchell & Co.,230
McPhails, Inc. (Buyer) contracted with Stratton (Seller) to buy Seller's
appliance store.2 31 Prior to the sale, the parties jointly hired Peat,
Marwick, Mitchell & Co. (PMM) to assess the financial position of the
store.23 2 Three days before the agreement was executed, PMM discovered new information indicating that the appliance store was less valuable than originally thought. 2 33 As a result, the Buyer sued the Seller for
breach of the sales contract, fraud and misrepresentation; the Buyer also
sued PMM over the amount owed for accounting services.2 34
The Seller filed a cross-complaint against PMM seeking indemnity
for any liability that the Seller might have to the Buyer.235 The Seller's
theory was that any misrepresentations made were due to PMM's incorrect assessment of the store's financial position.2 36 PMM settled with the
Buyer and sought to dismiss the Seller's cross-complaint under section
877.6(C). 237 The Seller argued that its indemnity cross-complaint was
not barred, in that it was for implied contractual indemnity. 2 38 The
court disagreed and held that implied contractual indemnity is subsumed
within partial equitable indemnity as defined by section 877.6(c), and
ruled that the Seller's cross-complaint should be dismissed. 2 39
226. Id. at 801, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 446.
227. Id. at 803, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 447.
228. Id.
229. See Stratton, 190 Cal. App. 3d at 292, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 377; see also IRM Corp., 179
Cal. App. 3d at 108-09, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 446 (1986); Kramer v. Cedu Found., Inc. 93 Cal.
App. 3d 1, 155 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1979).
230. 190 Cal. App. 3d 286, 235 Cal. Rptr. 374 (1987).
231. Id. at 288, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 375.
232. Id. at 289, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 375.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 288, 289, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 374, 375.
235. Id., 235 Cal. Rptr at 375.
236. Id. at 289, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 375.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 291, 235 Cal. Rptr at 376.
239. Id. at 292, 235 Cal. Rptr at 377.
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The difference in the reasoning used by the Stratton and County of
Los Angeles courts is reflective of that previously described in this Comment.2" In County of Los Angeles, the court focused on the contract
between the two defendants, the County and the architect, as the basis
for the duty to indemnify.24 1 The court furthermore reasoned that an
examination of the purpose and history behind section 877.6(c) revealed
that the rule was not intended to bar claims for implied contractual indemnity.24 2 The Stratton court argued that implied contractual indemnity is merely a form of equitable indemnity and is subject to the
guidelines of American Motorcycle.24 3
This Comment argues that the Stratton view-that implied contractual indemnity falls within the holding of American Motorcycle-is correct. As demonstrated above, implied contractual indemnity should be
considered by courts to have been subsumed under the doctrine of comparative indemnity. 2' The County of Los Angeles view, based on the
belief that implied contractual indemnity is theoretically distinct from
comparative indemnity, is erroneous.
2.

Bay Development, Ltd. v. Superior Court

The Supreme Court of California has granted review in Bay Development, Ltd. v. Superior Court.24 5 Bay Development presents the court
with an opportunity to definitively resolve the implied contractual indemnity issues in California-whether implied contractual indemnity has
survived American Motorcycle and whether the settlement-bar statutes
apply to implied contractual indemnity. The court of appeal decision is
not published. Bay Development concerns a dispute over property known
as the Mission Village Condominium Project. 24 Home Capital Corporation (Home) purchased the project before 1978 and began rehabilitation
240. See supra notes 181-203 and accompanying text.
241. County of Los Angeles, 155 Cal. App. 3d at 802-03, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 44647. The
analysis offered by the court was:
In summary, all damages allegedly suffered by TGI flow from the alleged defects
in Architect's plans. County's liability to TGI for those defects is necessarily based
on its contract with TGI by which it undertook to provide TGI with proper plans.
Since Architect, by reason of its contract with County, undertook to provide
plans free of defects, its failure to do so provides a basis for shifting County's entire
liability to Architect.
Id. at 803, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 447.

242. Id., 202 Cal. Rptr. at 447-48.
243. Stratton, 190 Cal. App. 3d at 291-92, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 376-77.
244. See supra notes 181-203 and accompanying text.
245. Bay Dev. Ltd. v. Superior Court, S000888 (Cal. Sup. Ct. filed May 8, 1987).
246. Brief for Petitioner, App. at 6, Bay Dev. Ltd. v. Superior Court, S000888 (Cal. Sup.
Ct. filed May 8, 1987).
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and legal proceedings to convert the project from apartments into condo-

miniums. 24 7 As part of this process, Home obtained a report from the

California Department of Real Estate (DRE) which described the project
as having 365 parking spaces.248 Subsequently, Home sold the complex
to Bay Development, which actually converted the complex into a condominium development. 249 Before Bay Development sold any units to
the public, it obtained a second report from DRE indicating that the
project had 365 parking spaces. 250 However, the actual number of parking spaces was only 326.251

The underlying lawsuit was brought by two sets of plaintiffs, the
Mission Villag Condominium Association and a class of persons con25 2
sisting of all original purchasers of condominiums in the project.
These plaintiffs alleged that they suffered substantial damage from the
25 3
dimunition in the value of their property due to the parking shortage.
Specifically, they contended that Home originated and that Bay Development continued the misrepresentation regarding the availability of park25 4
ing in the project.
After the original action was filed, a number of cross-actions ensued.255 The most relevant to this discussion was Bay Development's
cross-complaint against Home for equitable and implied contractual indemnity. After these cross-complaints had been filed, Home settled with
the plaintiffs.256 Home sought to dismiss Bay Development's implied
contractual indemnity cross-complaint on the theory that, under section
877.6(c), it was immune from any indemnity actions.257 Bay Development, however, had cross-complained for implied contractual indemnity.
Bay Development, however, claimed that implied contractual indemnity
was not barred by section 877.6.258

The issues raised in Bay Development are the same as in Bear Creek
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 7.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 2. The court treated these two sets of plaintiffs as having substantially the same
interests. Id. at 19. For the purposes of this Comment they will be referred to as simply
"plaintiffs."
253. Id. at 7.
254. Id. at 7-8.
255. Id. at 3.
256. Id. at 4.
257. Id.
258. Id.
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PlanningCommittee v. Title Insurance & Trust Co.,259 County of Los Angeles and Stratton. Should a duty to indemnify be implied from a contract or should the relationship be analyzed using traditional contract
doctrines? Even if such a duty should be implied, does it justify overriding the policy of encouraging settlements inherent in section 877.6(c)?
Based on the analysis in this Comment, the answers to these questions
are as follows: First, implied contractual indemnity is not grounded in
contract law and thus, it does not make sense to imply a duty to indemnify from a contract; 2" and second, since the parties have not clearly
expressed their intent to shift the risk of loss, the policy laid out in section 877.6(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure of encouraging settlement
should prevail.26 '
Based on the reasoning advanced in this Comment, the California
Supreme Court should decide Bay Development in favor of Home. The
court should hold that a duty to indemnify should not be implied from a
contract; rather, any recovery should be calculated as consequential
damages.
IV.

PROPOSAL

All jurisdictions should enact legislation to eliminate implied contractual indemnity or at the very least, encompass the doctrine within the
reach of settlement-bar statutes. This section proposes specific legislation
to that end in both California and New York.
A.

California

To avoid any ambiguities ensuing from the impending Bay Development, Ltd. v. Superior Court26 2 decision, the California legislature should
amend the settlement-bar statute, Code of Civil Procedure section
877.6(c), to provide:
A determination by the court that the settlement was made in
good faith shall bar any other joint tortfeasor or co-obligor
from any further claims against the settling tortfeasor or coobligor for equitable comparative contribution, implied contractual indemnity, or partial or comparative indemnity, based on
comparative negligence or comparative fault.2 6 3
By so amending the statute, it will become clear that claims for implied
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.

164 Cal. App. 3d 1227, 211 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1985).
See supra notes 41-85 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 181-203 and accompanying text.
Bay Dev. Ltd. v. Superior Court, S000888 (Cal. Sup. Ct. filed May 8, 1987).
The proposed language tracks the language of current section 877.6(c) verbatim, ex-
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contractual indemnity will not survive a good faith settlement. Thus, a

defendant can settle with a plaintiff with the assurance that he or she will
not be subject to future litigation on the same claim. With such knowledge, defendants will be encouraged to settle, thus providing plaintiffs
with a speedier recovery.
B.

New York

Like California, New York should amend its settlement-bar statute
to bar claims for implied contractual indemnity. 2 Section 15-108(b) of
the New York General Obligations Law provides: "A release given in
good faith by the injured person to one tortfeasor as provided in subdivi-

sion (a) relieves him from liability to any other person for contribution as
provided in article fourteen of the civil practice law and rules."26

The

word "contribution" in this statute has been interpreted by the New
York courts to exclude implied contractual indemnity.2 66 Thus, claims

for implied contractual indemnity are not barred by the statute. Unlike
California, the New York case law is undivided on the meaning of this

statute.
The New York General Obligations Code should be amended to
read:
A release given in good faith by the injured person to one
tortfeasor as provided in subdivision (a) relieves him from liability to any other person for contribution orfor implied contractual indemnity as provided in article fourteen of the civil
practice law and rules.2 67
V.

CONCLUSION

The doctrine of implied contractual indemnity is obsolete.

Califor-

nia and New York, among other states, now permit comparative equitacept for the addition of the reference to "implied contractual indemnity." See CAL. CIV.
PROC. CODE § 877.6(c) (West Supp. 1989) (as amended by Author).
264. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 15-108 (McKiNNEY 1978). See supra text accompanying
note 1 for text of statute.
265. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 15-108(B).
266. See McDermott v. City of New York, 50 N.Y.2d 211, 406 N.E.2d 460, 428 N.Y.S.2d
643 (1980); Riviello v. Waldron, 47 N.Y.2d 297, 391 N.E.2d 1278, 418 N.Y.S.2d 300 (1979);
Rock v. Reed-Prentice Div. of Package Mach. Co., 39 N.Y.2d 34, 346 N.E.2d 520, 382
N.Y.S.2d 720 (1976).
267. The proposed language tracks the language of current section 15-108(b) verbatim, except for the addition of the reference to "implied contractual indemnity." See N.Y. GEN.
OBLIG. LAW § 15-108(b) (as amended by Author).
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ble indemnity among multiple tortfeasors. 2 6 A judgment due to a
plaintiff by a group of defendants can be allocated among the defendants
according to their respective degrees of fault.26 9 Thus, under modem
tort law, there is no need for courts to use implied contractual indemnity
to allocate liability to a defendant.
Moreover, under contract law, any of the damages that can be recovered by implied contractual indemnity can be recovered as expectancy damages. Thus, implied contractual indemnity is unnecessary as a
matter of tort or contract law.
Both California and New York should take the first step toward
eliminating implied contractual indemnity by amending their respective
settlement-bar statutes to bar implied contractual indemnity claims
against settling defendants. Furthermore, all jurisdictions that allow
comparative indemnity should legislatively eliminate implied contractual
indemnity.
Jeremy J.F. Gray*

268. American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 591, 578 P.2d 899, 909,
146 Cal. Rptr. 182, 190 (1978); Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331
N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972).
269. See supra notes 22-27 and accompanying text.
* The Author thanks his wife Teri for her support.
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